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U.K. Small Firm Bankruptcy 
Prediction: A Logit Analysis of Financial 
Trend-, Industry-, and Macro-Effects
Robert C. Cressy
I. INTRODUCTION
Much work has been done in the last two decades to estimate the determinants 
o£ bankruptcy of large firms. (See Storey, Keasey, Watson and Wynarczyck
[19]—henceforth SKWW—for references). Very little apart from the early 
work of Edmister [7] in the United States and more recently the work of 
SKWW [19] in the United Kingdom appears to have been attempted in the 
area of small firm bankruptcy. This paper goes some way to remedy the 
deficiency by estimating conditional logistic probability regressions for small 
firm bankruptcy on a recently constructed U.K. accounts database.
Our methodology like Edmister [7] and SKWW [19] highlights the 
importance of financial ratio trend effects on small firm bankruptcy 
potential. However our empirical specification of trends is more general than 
that of previous work. We show that a five-year lag structure in financial 
ratios generates the best model for the data. In addition we examine the 
influence of industry effects and explore the use of year-dummies proxying 
economy-wide influences on small firm bankruptcy potential. These latter 
can be thought of as proxies for macroeconomic effects, the precise nature 
of which are the subject of further research.
Our results thus demonstrate quite conclusively that several years’ data 
on financial ratio variables are required to provide reasonable predictive 
accuracy on small firm solvency rather than the one year’s accounts 
information traditionally used in large firm analysis.
The paper also demonstrates by drawing on the work of Palepu [15] 
and Zmijewski [23] the empirical biases that can arise from uncritical use 
of state-based sampling techniques.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II provides a summary of 
the recent critical literature in the econometric analysis of bankruptcy. There 
we set up the basic framework for use in Section III which reruns the SKWW
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analysis of U.K. small-firm bankruptcy. Section IV introduces some novel 
elements into the empirical approach. Using an expanded variable set we 
examine the impact of industry-, year- and financial trend-effects on small 
firm bankruptcies. Section V summarizes the results and draws some policy 
conclusions.
II. FOUNDATIONS OF BANKRUPTCY ANALYSIS: 
THE RECENT CRITIQUE
The explanation of why firms fail and the prediction of their failure has 
been a subject of interest to academics in finance for the last two decades. 
The earliest statistical analysis of the causes of bankruptcy is Beaver [4] who 
used univariate accounting ratio techniques to attempt to provide an “early- 
warning system” for impending financial disaster. However it was Altman
[1] who first introduced multivariate techniques into the literature by way 
of MDA (Multivariate Discriminant Analysis) and Altman’s 1968 paper has 
spawned a huge literature on the prediction of bankruptcy. (See, e.g., Zavgren 
[22] for a survey). Much of this literature involves verbal theorizing to justify 
the choice of particular financial ratios used as explanatory variables in the 
statistical model. Recent contributions however have provided formal 
mathematical models of the bankruptcy process which can be more 
scientifically tested using ratio data (e.g., Cressy [5]).*
Much of the informal statistical work in the area has recently been placed 
into question by two perceptive papers (Zmijewski [23] and Palepu [15]). 
These papers constitute a sophisticated critique of the statistical methods that 
have been employed by drawing on the earlier analysis of Manski and 
Lerman [14]. The latter identifies the need for appropriate adjustments to 
traditional model estimation techniques in the context of a theory of state- 
based sampling. Palepu and Zmijewski however establish the precise 
statistical effects of erroneous sampling methods on the prediction of 
bankruptcy using MDA and LIMDEP (Limited Dependent Variable) 
methods. Finally, the papers contain a discussion of the criteria for optimal 
cutoff points in bankruptcy classification in the context of a literature that 
commonly assumes arbitrary values.
To get a flavor of this critique consider a population containing two 
groups of observations A’s and B’s. In this context a state-based sample is 
a non-random sample where the researcher chooses the sample proportions 
of A’s and B’s with different probabilities. Sample proportions of A’s and 
B’s will not therefore reflect population proportions as would be the case 
with random sampling. There are often good statistical reasons for choosing 
state-based rather than random sampling. For example, if one group has only
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small numbers in the population it may be desirable to select disproportion­
ately in its favor. On the other hand, adjustments to estimation techniques 
need to be made to avoid a number of serious statistical errors. In particular, 
over-representation of one group in the sample relative to the population 
will bias upwards the classification accuracy of that group in any statistical 
attempt at discrimination within the sample and will yield the misleading 
impression that the model can predict well in the wider population. This 
impression is enhanced if the holdout sample used to “verify” the model’s 
predictive power is itself subject to sampling bias similar to that in the 
estimation sample.
Consider the question of classification cutoff points. A cutoff value in 
the logistic model serves to divide the population into two groups on the 
basis of probabilities. If a firm’s estimated probability is above the cutoff it 
is classified as bankrupt and if below as active. Intuitively the choice of cutoff 
point must reflect the expected gains/losses over alternatives. Suppose we 
evaluate the losses arising from Type I and Type II errors in classification 
and imagine starting with an zirbitrary probability cutoff value po . Firms 
are classified as bankrupt or active as their observed probability pi falls above/ 
below po. This rule will generate an expected loss with weights the posterior 
joint probabilities of pairs (/?,, yi), y, =  0 or 1. If the cutoff value is varied 
marginally then the Type I/II error will in general rise/fall and the Type 
II/I error will fall/rise, changing the expected loss accordingly. If the 
expected loss falls, it follows that we have not chosen po optimally. Since 
most studies have not considered this issue it is highly probable that their 
assumed cutoffs are not optimal in the above sense.
More precisely, Palepu [15] has shown that state-based sampling 
methods in the absence of the appropriate adjustments lead to (i) upward 
bias and inconsistency in estimates of the probability of bankruptcy, and (ii) 
upward bias to classification accuracy. Arbitrary cutoff points for 
classification are also shown to lead to erroneous results, though the 
assessment will depend on the precise model of bankruptcy assumed. 
Zmijewski [23] demonstrates these points empirically on U.S. large firm data 
and also addresses an additional “missing data problem.” This relates to the 
fact—potentially very significant for small firms—that some firms may have 
one or more model variables missing in a given period. Usually the solution 
in the literature has been simply to ignore such observations. Zmijewski 
shows that this is a valid procedure only under very special circumstances. 
Failure to deal with the problem is shown to generate sample selection bias 
with again potentially serious effects on prediction.^
Palepu [15] provides the appropriate Bayesian formulae to summarize 
the issues and will be useful in explaining the empirical methods to be 
adopted below.
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The sample probability of firm i becoming bankrupt in a given period 
is given by
p B  =  Pr{j tB  I i e S}
_  Pr {t eB, i e 5}
Pr {z e S}
Pr{^ e S  I ? e
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Pr{« e S h ' e B}Pr{i e 5} +  Pr{i e S \ i e  A}Pr{i e A}
TTB pB
TTApA +  TTBpB (1)
where
A, B and S are sets of active, bankrupt and sampled firms tta =  
ua/N a and ttb =  ub/N b;
Na, N b are the population numbers of A ’s and B’s, respectively; 
ua, riB are the sample numbers of A ’s and B’s, respectively; 
pB =  Pr{i e B} is the population probability of being a B.
Note that if t t a  =  ttb (random sampling) then ps  ^ =  pB, i.e., the 
population and sample probabilities coincide. For state-based or non- 
random sampling jfc>/ 7^ pB- In the case most commonly encountered in the 
literature, that of equal sampling, riA =  riB. Since N b  is usually much smaller 
than N a  we have Pb' >  pB, i.e., an upward bias is imparted to the bankruptcy 
probability by the sampling method adopted. Palepu shows that the optimal 
cutoff probability under plausible assumptions^ is given by the following 
equality
f { p \ i e B ) = f { p \ i e A )  (2)
where/(jt» \ ieZ) is the conditional probability density of observing a predicted 
bankruptcy probability p  if the firm is actually a Z {= B or A). This is 
equivalent in fact to choosing the cutoff point so as to minimize the sample 
X of the model and under certain assumptions to minimize the expected 
loss from misclassification.
The population probability of bankruptcy of firm i in a conditional 
logit model is given by
P B =(l+exp(-p 'x i))-^  (3)
where Xi is a vector of financial ratios for firm i and )8 a vector of parameters. 
Using equations (1) above (3) yields
pfi =  [1 +  {tta/ ttb) exp (—jS'x,) ]"* (4)
where we recall that tta, ttb are the sample proportions of A ’s and B’s, 
respectively. This formula can be rewritten as
Pb =  [ \ +  exp (-(V  +  (5)
where y  =  ln(7rB/7r^). Thus the parameter bias effect of state-based sampling 
operates entirely through the intercept term. (See also Maddala [13], p. 90). 
An advantage of this fact is that estimation of probabilities can proceed by 
maximum likelihood on the state-based sample and the appropriate adjust­
ments to estimated probabilities can be made ex post. However, this method 
has the drawback that it does not produce maximized likelihood statistics to 
check goodness-of-fit, a statistic which has then to be estimated by other means 
(e.g., graphical). The alternative is non-standard MLE using the functional 
form (5) directly. This is the method employed in the present study.
Optimal cutoff points for classification in the two-state case can be 
calculated using the Savage regret function.'* Denoting the estimated 
probability of bankruptcy by pi, the set of firms classified into the bankrupt 
category by P* =  {pc. pi ^ p * ]  and the loss from action a, when state sj holds 
by L{ai, sj) the expected loss from the classification scheme is given by
EL =  L{Pi e P*, i e A)P{Pi eP* , i e  A}
+  L{Pi e -  P*, i e B)P{Pi e -  P*, i e B}
1 p- 
=  L b a  j j { p \ y  =  Q)dp ’ qo +  L a b  J  f(p \ y — \)dp • qi (6)
where L b a ,  L a b  is abbreviated notation for misclassification losses and qo, 
q \  are prior probabilities of being an ^  or a B, respectively. Minimizing this 
expected loss or regret with respect to p* we get
KP* I y =  0) ^  L A s q x  
f i p *  I y =  1) L b a  qo
U.K. Small Firm Bankruptcy Prediction 237
subject to
f'iP* \y =  0) ^  LABqi
f ( ^ p * \ y  =  l )  L B A q o
Thus at the optimum the marginal expected losses from misclassification 
based on posterior densities must be equal.^
It is worth noting finally before moving on to the empirical analysis 
that the traditional use of classification accuracy as an assessment criterion 
usually relies simply on the proportion of successes and failures correctly 
classified. Since this ignores the associated Type I and Type II error costs 
discussed above it is extremely misleading: models with large and small 
prediction error rates are rated as equivalent on this criterion. A much more 
satisfactory measure of goodness-of-fit and empirical indicator of prediction 
accuracy is the pseudo-i?^ (see Maddala [13]).® This is the primary measure 
of the explanatory power of the model that we shall use in the empirical 
work that follows.
III. THE EMPIRICAL LITERATURE ON 
SMALL-FIRM BANKRUPTCY
Very little work has been done in the area of predicting small firm 
bankruptcy. Edmister [7] on U.S. data and SKWW [19] on U.K. data are the 
major contributions in the area. More specific topics aire dealt with in Keasey 
and Watson [10, 11].
Edmister (1972)
Edmister used discriminant analysis in the vein of Altman to examine 
the bankruptcy characteristics of 42 U.S. small firms. Two analyses were 
performed, one using firms for whom one year’s financial data was available 
prior to the event date and another using firms for whom three years’ 
financial data was available. Sampling rates were 100% of the bankrupts in 
each subsample and 15% and 19% of the actives for the one- and three-year 
sets respectively. He employed a stepwise approach to obviate problems of 
multicollinearity. Edmister nonetheless found (despite the obvious upward 
boost to classification accuracy implied by his sample selection procediires) 
that intertemporal instability displayed by small firm financial ratios meant 
that the one-year’s data model proved useless for bankruptcy prediction into 
the holdout sample. He concluded that one should use three-year averages 
instead of annual data and the three-year model so structured predicted well 
in the holdout.’
By way of criticism of Edmister’s study we note that apart from the 
estimation bias implied by Edmister’s sample selection procedure the 
averaging method used in the three-year analyses has the econometric 
disadvantage that it imposes unnecessary parameter restrictions on the model
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being estimated. Thus using a three-year average assumes that the regression 
weights attached to each year’s variable value are the same. A general lag 
structure in which the weights are allowed to be determined by the data is 
clearly a better specification.
SKWW (1987)
SKWW [19] in a pioneering study of U.K. small firm bankruptcy used 
discriminant and logit analysis to examine the bankruptcy potential of a set 
of 636 small U.K. firms. Our discussion of their extensive study will relate 
primarily to their logit analysis, the technique employed in the present paper.
The SKWW sample was defined as all firms in the Northern region of 
England with at least one years’ published (Companies House) accounts data 
and with less than 200 employees. In addition, firms had to be limited, single 
plant, independent, manufacturing companies. The 8 variables used in logit 
analysis were selected from a larger set of 12 variables by factor analysis to 
represent the characteristics of liquidity, profitability, and so on thought to 
be relevant to the prediction of bankruptcy. The set of 12 variables was as 
follows:
W1. Current assets/Current liabilities
W2. Net profit/Total assets
W3. Fixed assets/Total assets
W4. (Pre-tax profit +  depreciation)/Total debt
W5. (Pre-tax profit before directors’ fees +  interest)/Total debt
W6. (Total debt excl. bank overdraft)/Total assets
W7. Current assets/Total assets*
W8. (Current assets-stock)/Total assets 
W9. Net profit/Fixed assets 
WIO. Fixed assets/Net worth 
W11. Net profit/(Current assets-current liabilities)
W12. Pre-tax profit/Net worth
IV. THE PRESENT STUDY
Our empirical study falls into two main parts. First, we re-estimate SKWW’s 
equations on the same database and examine their statistical credentials. 
Second, we respecify the model introducing a general lag structure and 
additional variables, and estimate this for comparison. A novel element in 
our approach in addition to the specification of trends is the incorporation 
of macroeconomic variables represented by year-dummies.
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A Rerun of SKWW (1987)
To simplify terminology in what follows we make the following 
definitions.
Definition 1: The regression of a dependent variable y observed in period 
t on a set of independent variables xi, ... x„ observed in periods t — k, t — 
k +  I , ... t — 1 is called a “[t — k , .... t — I t] regression.”
Definition 2: A complete observation on q variables is one in which each 
of the q variables has a non-missing value.
Eight variables Wl, W2, W4, W5, W7, W9, W ll, W12 were selected by 
SKWW from the above set by means of factor analysis and a series of 5 annual 
logit regressions (\t — t\, k =  ... 5) on firms with 3 and 7 consecutive 
years’ “complete” (8-variable) data were run.^° To minimize sampling bias we 
ran instead [t — k ^  t], k — \, ... b regressions using pooled complete 
observations from the period 1970-1980 on the SKWW subset of 8 variables. 
Thus initially we imposed no requirement for a panel of individual firm data.
We note that a random pooled sample should reflect the annual average 
number of B’s to the annual average number of A’s in its sample proportions. 
The SKWW sample consisted of all the B’s and an equal number of A’s in 
the period 1970-1980. We have seen above that to avoid parameter bias, 
adjustments then need to be made to the estimated coefficients. 
Unfortunately, SKWW do not in fact do this.
Our group sample numbers for the 8-variable regressions were initially 
the total number of B’s in the 11-year sample 1970-1980 and the average 
annual number of A ’s for the subset of variables in question (L(k — l)Wi, 
k =  1, ... 5, where L  denotes the lag operator). The regression results are 
reported in Table 1 including numbers of A’s and B’s used in each case.
The equations were then re-estimated using equation (5) above to reflect 
population proportions. Probabilities and classification statistics were 
recalculated in each case choosing classification cutoff points optimally. 
Results are presented in Table 2 together with the SKWW results for 
comparison."
Discussion
We note from Table la that the similarity of the SKWW results with 
our own is not very great. In particular coefficients differ sometimes 
substantially not only in magnitude but also in sign. This may be explicable 
of course by reference to the different sampling criteria employed.'^
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Years
Prior
Table la
Regressions from the 8-variable Set Without Parameter Adjustment 
(SKWW Counterparts in Square Brackets)^ ^
W1 W2 W4 W5 W7 W9 Wll W12
1 -2.562** -0.266 
[ -1.300 -0.137
2 -2.392** -0.094 
[ -2.076 0.141
3 -1.582** -0.341** 
[ -1.397 -0.427
4 -1.266** -0.199*
[ -0.839 0.595
5 -1.531** -0.041 
[ 0.314 0.320
6 -1.622** -0.011 
[ -
■3.495**
0.952
-3.817**
2.984
-2.181*
-0.974
-0.285
1.047
-0.320
■0.123
-0.174
0.269
- 0.021
0.227
-0.107
0.113
-0.178
0.034
-0.388**
0.031
0.381
-0.958
0.293
-0.459
-0.429
-0.078
-0.694
0.022
-1.430*
0.526
2.233*
2.219
2.265**
-1.923
2.252**
-1.860
1.942**
-1.727
2.188**
-0.799
-0.087
0.295
-0.014
-0.086
0.093
0.003
0.131
-0.041
0.341
0.015
-0.014
-0.011
0.014
0.095
-0.173*
-0.012
0.000
0.012
0.009
0.057
0.177 -0.050 -0.852 1.963* -0.358 0.033
-0.164 
-0.207 ]
0.029 
-0.007 ]
-0.050 
-0.004 ]
-0.046 
0.043 ]
-0.124 
0.140 ]
-0.118 
-- ]
Note: ** denotes significance at 1% and * at 5% level.
Table lb
Classification Accuracy, Optimal Cutoffs and ^  for Regressions in Table la 
(SKWW Counterparts in Square Brackets)
Years
Prior
-2 log-L R
(X^Sdf)
% Correctly Classified Optimal
Cutoff MR^ N a N bB A T O T
1 16.37 21 97 83 0.33 0.16* 268 57
[19.97] [100] [3] [94] [?] [?]
2 25.96 56 73 68 0.28 0.11** 258 88
[42.62] [28] [97] [88] [?] [?]
3 42.16 65 71 69 0.32 0.16** 243 108
[39.56] [41] [92] [81] [?] [?]
4 24.06 26 91 69 0.44 0.10** 222 113
[46.29] [13] [97] [73] [?] [?]
5 38.69 64 67 66 0.34 0.17** 199 102
[26.47] [7] [100] [69] [?] [?]
6 7.69 40 82 68 0.40 0.09* 174 90
[ - — — " -- -- ]
Notes: (i) Our measures of goodness-of-fit are McFadden’s adjusted for degrees of freedom defined 
as MR^ = (x \p )-2py(-2 log (L o ,))  where La, is the maximum likelihood function under the Null 
hypothesis and p  the number of parameters estimated in the Alternative hypothesis.
(ii) ** denotes significance at 1% and * at 5% level.
Table 2
Classification Accuracy, Optimal Cutoffs and for Regressions from the 
8-Variable Set With Parameter Adjustments
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Years
Prior
—2log-LR % Correctly Classified Optimal
Cutoff(X 8df) B A T O T MR^ N a N b
1 9.45 67 70 70 0.02 0.02 268 57
2 13.16 65 60 60 0.03 0.02 258 88
3 38.43 85 42 44 0.03 0.04** 243 108
4 20.16 83 34 36 0.04 0.02** 222 113
5 35.70 80 48 49 0.04 0.05** 199 102
6 22.66 73 50 50 0.04 0.04** 174 90
The maximum for our initial (unadjusted) regressions is very low 
(maximum 17% for the 5-years’ prior regression).’^  Thus the unadjusted 
SKWW model does not seem to explain the data well.
Overall classification accuracy on the unadjusted model reported in 
Table IB is lower than reported by SKWW in conformity with Palepu’s [15] 
results on classification bias.*'* Classification accuracy on the B’s for given 
cutoff will be lower the lower the sample proportion of fi’s. SKWW’s B- 
classification accuracy from Table 1 is, however, largely less than ours despite 
the smaller proportion of B’s in our sample. This is most probably because 
of the employment of different cutoff optimality criteria. However, since 
SKWW do not report optimal cutoffs no precise conclusion can be drawn.
Finally the results for the parameter-adjusted regressions in Table 2 
demonstrate very clearly the major effects of classification bias. For constant 
cutoff optimality criteria the for all the equations are a fraction of their 
original values and the maximum B? declines to 5% (for the 5-years’ prior 
equation). Despite this we see that the proportion of correctly classified 
bankrupts is still as high as 85%. This result highlights quite dramatically 
the dubious nature of most classification reporting procedures in the 
literature. By concentrating on the percentage of actual B’s classified correctly 
they ignore the prediction error rates associated with this accuracy.’*
A New Approach to the Empirical Analysis
Before moving on to the empirical analysis proper we introduce four 
new variables into the model on the basis of their popularity in the financial 
and accounting literature. They are defined as follows:
W13. Cashflow/Total debt
W14. Equity/Total debt
W15. Quick assets/Current liabilities
W16. Creditors/Debtors
Apart from W14 which measures in some sense the financial risk of the 
firm’s activities these additional variables are indicative of the degree of 
liquidity of the firm’s balance sheet.
We now examine the influence of economy- and industry-wide factors 
and trends in financial ratios on the explanation of bankruptcy potential 
of U.K. small firms. To be able statistically to pick up economy-wide effects 
requires the use of models with explanatory data covering several years rather 
than one. Thus the economy-wide regressions are essentially pooled-data 
models. Also while there is precedent in the literature for financial trend 
analysis we have seen above the econometric specification has been that of 
3-year averages. It was pointed out earlier that this is nonoptimal and in 
what follows we employ a general lag structure to analyze trend effects 
leaving the data to determine weights to be assigned to individual variables.
The sample used in these regressions is the population of firms with 
complete observations on current and lagged values of W1-W16 defined 
above. This is of course not a random sample of small firms from the 
population of small firms at large but may be thought of as a random sample 
of firms with (up to) six years’ complete data on sixteen variables. Again 
while it is likely that there is bias in the dataset used due to the substantial 
propensity of small firms to nonsubmission of accounts [11], the SKWW 
database unfortunately does not allow estimation of sample selection bias 
from this source.*’ Finally we note that a disadvantage of imposing the 
requirement of six years’ data to be available for each firm is that the sample 
size for bankrupts is reduced to 17**. The model selection method employed 
was a forward stepwise procedure using a 10% variable entry/exit criterion.*^
Industry Effects
The 636 firms in the database fall into 89 industrial (MLH) categories. 
To make the industry analysis manageable we reduced this number by 
aggregation to 27 categories. Initial regressions were run on the set of 27 
industrial dummies. The results were as follows.
A regression on all 27 variables rejected Ho at less than 0.5% level but 
explained only 18% of the variation of probabilities across firms. 
Furthermore, collinearity among regressors resulted in “only” 14 of the 
industry dummies being individually significant at the 10% level. Finally,
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the highest (absolute) partial correlation^® of any significant independent 
variable with the dependent variable was only 12%.
We conclude that industry factors have some importance in the 
explanation of bankruptcies of small firms. However to examine how far 
the industry dummies’ explanatory power persists when the effects of 
financial ratios have been taken into account we ran an additional regression 
with financial and industry variables simultaneously included. The results 
are discussed later.
Year Effects
The fact that observations are pooled in our analysis allows us to 
examine the differential impact of time-specific or more intuitively of 
temporal economy-wide effects on bankruptcy probabilities. Macro-effects 
were examined here by defining year-dummies for each of the years 1970- 
1980.^ * A regression on these dummies alone was then run. The outcome 
was as follows.
The model at 23% was higher than that for the industry model and 
Ho was rejected at below the 0.5% level. Likewise the Null hypothesis on 
individual year dummies was rejected at 7% or below for 1970 and 1976-1980 
inclusive. The maximum partial correlation of any year dummy with y was 
19% for 1980 followed by 14% for 1978. The partials for the remaining years 
were much lower.
In conclusion the year- or macro-effects alone explain a significant 
proportion of the variation of bankruptcy probabilities across firms with 
some years much more important than others. There are therefore grounds 
for including year-effects in a more general model with financial ratio trends 
and to investigate the nature of the specific macroeconomic variables at 
work.^^
Financial-Ratio Trend Effects
To examine the effects of trends in financial ratio Vciriables we first ran 
the regression [i — 6, ... , f — 1 — i] using variables 1-16. The results are 
presented in Table 3 and we now summarize these.
The for the financial ratios model alone is 58.1% and significant at 
below the 0.5% level. Five of the seven variables in the optimal model are 
significant at 1% or below. Individual partials vary between 11% and 38%. 
Seventy-one percent of failures are identified at relatively small cost in terms 
of Type I errors. The failure prediction accuracy of the model at 50% is 
satisfactory.
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Table 3
16-Variable Financial Trend Regression^ '*
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C L4W2 W2 L5W1 L2W2 L5W5 L3W12 L2W3
Coeff -6.7 -.97 -.98 .66 -1.0 -.70 -.79 -2.5
SigLvl(%) .7 .07 .00 .00 .00 3.0 9.4 .00
N  = 993 Na = 976 N*= 17
MR^ =  0.581 (Sig Lvl(%) = ,00) Optimal cutoff =  0.16
% Classified correctly % Correct Predictions”
B A T B A T
71 99 98 50 99 98
Combined Effects Models
The same financial variables are included as in the financial effects 
model first with industry- and then with year-dummies. The results are 
presented in Tables 4 and 5. Finally a regression including all three effects 
was made. The results of this are presented in Table 6.
The optimal models for financial effects (Table 3) financial +  industry 
effects (Table 4) and financial +  year effects (Table 5) can be compared.
Financial ratio trend effects are seen to remain important when industry 
effects have been accounted for (Table 4). Of the industry dummies industries 
2,29 and 25 have coefficients significant at below the 2% level and have partial 
r’s between 14% and 24%. The for the financial +  industry effects model 
is roughly the same as for the financial model alone at 58.4% and is significant 
at below the 0.5% level. 59% of failures are identified with a 42% prediction 
accuracy. Thus by comparison with the financial effects model the financial 
+ industry model has an identical but a somewhat lower B-classification 
and B-prediction accuracy. Finally we note that the two models have 
substantial overlap in the financial variables included.
In conclusion, in terms of statistical significance (both for the regression 
as a whole and for individual variables) and in terms of explanatory power 
there is very little to choose between the financial and financial +  industry 
models. Little significance should be placed on the differences in 
classification accuracy. However, since the industry effects may reflect 
unrepeatable historical trends in industrial structure, we recommend the 
financial trends model over the financial +  industry model for policy 
purposes.
Regarding the financial +  year model (Table 5) Ho is rejected at below 
the 0.5% level. The final model with nine variables explains 57% of the 
variation of the dependent variable. Eight financial variables appear in the
Table 4
16-Variable Financial +  Industry Regression
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C L2W9 L4W2 W2 L5W1 W3 IND2 IND29 U W 5 IND25
Coeff -6.7 -1.7 -.90 -.65 .45 -1.6 3.4 1.8 -1.0 3.3
Sig Lvl(%) 1.3 0.0 .05 .07 1.6 .02 .05 1.8 1.1 1.9
N  = 993 Na = 976 Nb =  17
MR  ^= 0.584 (Sig Lvl(%) =  .00) Optimal cutoff =  0.13
% Classified correctly % Correct Predictions
B A T  B A T
59 98 98 42 99 98
Table 5
16-Variable Financial +  Year Regression
C L4W2 W2 L5W1 L2W2 L5W5 YRIO L2W3 U W 7  LW2
Coeff -7.3 -1.0 -.84 .74 -1.0 -1.2 .93 -3.07 -1.4 -.59
Sig Lvl(%) .00 .09 .01 .00 .02 .08 .47 .00 .97 2.0
N =  993 Na1 = 976 Nb =  17
MR  ^= 0.570 (Sig Lvl(%) =  .00) Optimal cutoff =  0.42
% C lassified correctly % Correct Predictions
B A T B A T
47 99 99 80 99 99
Table 6
16-Variable Financial +  Industry +  Year Regression
C L2W9 L4W2 W2 L5W1 W3 IND2 IND29 L5W5 IND25
Coeff -6.7 -1.7 -.90 -.65 .45 -1.6 3.4 1.8 -1.0 3.3
Sig Lvl(%) 1.3 0.0 .05 .07 1.6 .02 .05 1.8 1.1 1.9
N  =  m N A  =  916NB=  17
m e }  = 0.584 (Sig Lvl(%) = .00) Optimal cutoff =  0.13
% Classified correctly % Correct Predictions
B A T  B A T
59 98 98 42 99 98
Note: Identical results to Table 4.
model all significant at below the 1/2% level except L5W7 and LW2. Partials 
vary between 18% and 36%. Year effects (Year 6-Year 10) are reduced in the 
final model to one. Year 10, or 1980. This has a partial correlation of 11% 
with the dependent variable, but is significant at the .5% level.
Thus the financial +  year model explains the data marginally less well 
than the financial model. The classification accuracy of the model however 
falls even further below that of the financial effects model to 47% while the 
prediction accuracy of the model rises above that of the financial model to 
80%. Again we are inclined to place little significance on these latter statistics 
and rely mostly on the R^ . This implies that there is little difference between 
the models.
This fact is confirmed by the three-effects model. Table 6 is in fact 
identical to Table 4. Thus by a small margin the best fitting model seems 
to be the financial +  industry trend model. However, there is little to choose 
between them and for reasons discussed above we still regard the financial 
trend effects model as the best of the available alternatives.
Interpretation
Profitability (Net profits/Total assets, LiW2) appears in all models 
(financial, financial +  industry and financial +  year) and in virtually every 
prior year as a statistically significant determinant of bankruptcy. It has 
moreover a quite high negative correlation with the bankruptcy variable (up 
to 35% for 3 years’ prior) and has obvious intuitive appeal. Net profit relative 
to total debt (LiW5) also consistently appears to reduce the probability of 
bankruptcy in the early years.
No other variable plays so dominant role as profitability^^ in the small 
company’s financial fortunes. Our results suggest that it should be regairded 
as the major determinant of bankruptcy for small firms and one for which 
the influence of trends is paramount.^’ This result is furthermore consistent 
with financial and economic theories of firm bankruptcy (e.g., Van Horne
[20]; Jovanovic [9]).
In addition to profitability, liquidity variables feature importantly in 
the model. They also display a rather interesting pattern of behavior. In all 
models we find that liquidity (LiWl, (LiW3)“*)^ * is positively correlated with 
bankruptcy. This might be thought to be a spurious correlation since it is 
usually assumed that more liquid firms are less bankruptcy-prone. However, 
a firm’s failure to control costs or overexpansion of sales ( “overtrading”) 
may result in a cash flow problem and a reaction of the following form.
As the date of bankruptcy approaches, “doomed” companies attempt 
to extricate themselves from financial difficulty by expanding their short term 
loans and overdrafts with the bank).^^ However, this will increase liquidity
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in the sense of the current ratio (CA/CL) only if this ratio was originally 
less than one and the evidence is that for bankrupt firms other measures of 
liquidity (e.g., Net Working Capital/Total Assets) are sharply declining as 
the date of bankruptcy approaches. The inability to recognize that evasive 
action of this kind will not solve the problem can be therefore thought of 
as a component of the bankruptcy syndrome. The empirical result above then 
shows that increased borrowing resulting in “improvements” in the liquidity 
variables in balance sheet, especially at a relatively late stage (e.g., in L2W3) 
do not alter the firm’s fundamental problems but rather serve as a signal 
of the firm’s failure to tackle them. Firms that attempt to make such untimely 
adjustments are identified in the model as more (not less) likely to go bust.^‘
Finally the explanatory power these liquidity variables, measured by 
partial r’s is (in the financial model) around 28% so they have some 
importance in the prediction of insolvency.
It is also of interest to note that the financial economist’s darling, the 
debt-equity ratio, and the accountant’s favorite, the quick ratio, play no role 
in the optimal model. This suggests that they have no independent 
explanatory power in the determination of solvency probabilities. Thus, 
although a higher debt-equity ratio may increase the likelihood of 
bankruptcy if this ratio change is merely a symptom  of some other change 
in the firm (e.g., declining profitability), then holding the latter constant 
may anesthetize the gearing effect altogether.
A final comment on the classification accuracy of the financial model 
is in order. While the number of B’s is small both absolutely (a mere 17) 
and relative to the number of A ’s (there are 993 of them), 71% are classified 
accurately. Unlike many models in this area, the cost of this prediction 
accuracy is not high in terms of Type I errors (A’s classified as B’s). The 
ratio of predicted to actual iS’s is low at 1:1. Comparison with other studies 
is however impossible because prediction accuracy is generally not reported 
along with classification accuracy.
V. CONCLUSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
We have shown that it is possible to classify the bankruptcy behavior of small 
U.K. firms rather well from financial trend data, industry information and 
macroeconomic effects proxied by year-dummies. The preferred model was 
one that used simply the financial ratio trend effects as explanatory variables. 
The model developed is somewhat greedy in its consumption of data, 
requiring six years’ financial statements to generate an of 58%. 
Importantly, however, the coefficients of this model are stable and have clear 
economic/financial interpretations. In particular, the trends of profitability
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and liquidity variables in the years before bankruptcy occurs constitute a 
fascinating cautionary tale of the small firm’s eventual descent into 
insolvency.
The policy conclusions for government agencies flowing from the 
analysis are as follows/^
In a population of 1000 firms having six years’ financial data, about 
20 will become bankrupt in any one year. One-fortieth or about 25 of these 
1000 firms should be investigated. They are identified as the set of firms with 
bankruptcy probabilities in the model (financial trends) above 16% and 
predicted by the model as insolvent within one year. Within this set of twenty- 
five firms will be included about 70% of the actual bankrupts in the following 
year. About 50% or 12 of the identified firms will actually become insolvent 
within the period.
The precise value of the model to the government agency policy-maker 
will clearly depend on the costs of investigating 25 firms and the benefits 
from avoiding the insolvency of 12 such firms. However, the model is 
undoubtedly the best systematic guide to this kind of policy decision.
The policy conclusions for other categories of investor, e.g., the bank 
or venture capitalist receiving a loan request from a small company may 
of course be different. He may not be interested in investigating 25 firms for 
signs of impending insolvency but will wish to know whether the current 
loan applicant is likely to go bankrupt. The model has a roughly one in 
two chance of telling him this correctly and is therefore potentially of 
considerable use in evaluating his investment prospects.
Directions for Future Research
In a future paper it is intended to examine the underlying macro-effects 
implicit in the year-dummies used in the present paper. Also in the vein of 
SKWW [19] and Peel and Peel [16], we intend to examine the effects of adding 
to the financial trend variables off-balance sheet items such as lags in accounts 
submission and information on audit qualification. Both the above studies 
found such measures predictive.
Acknowledgments: I should like to thank the Editor and an anonymous referee of this 
Journal for helpful comments.
NOTES
1. The advantage of a formal model is that it provides comparative static signs which can 
be tested.
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2. Zmijewski’s study finds some bias present from this source. The likelihood of bias is 
however greater for small firms due to the much higher frequency of missing data. See 
Keasey & Watson [11] and note 17 (below).
3. Palepu’s [15] concern is to provide an economic model of takeovers rather than 
bankruptcies. However, the methodology has more general applicability. See Press [17, 
chapter 13].
4. See Savage [18] or Press [17] for details of the general theory.
5. This formula specializes to Palepu’s, provided the RHS =  1.
6. While a high R \ s not a guarantee of predictive ability (witness the position in the presence 
of multicollinearity) if individual coefficients are highly significant it is in practice a 
reasonably rehable guide. It is also one used throughout much of the economic/business 
literature as such in the absence of holdout data. Should such data become available any 
model should of course be tested to confirm the impression provided by the goodness- 
of-fit measure. However, chi-squared tests of the ex post fit of the model are much more 
reliable than the traditionally used classification methods employed in the bankruptcy 
literature (see Amemiya [2]).
7. It is perhaps worth noting that Edmister is one of the few writers to provide a discussion 
of the optimal choice of cutoff probability and to examine the effects of chance on 
classification accuracy.
8. By an accounting identity W3 =  1 — W7. The model is therefore impossible to estimate 
unless one of these variables is dropped. Since most computer programs do this and the 
Storey equations do not contain W3 we assume this has been done. The regression package 
we use automatically deletes redundant variables. We have therefore not deleted one of 
the two and the results that follow must be interpreted accordingly.
9. To my knowledge no attempt has been made in the literature to explore the effects of 
macroeconomic variables on individual firm bankruptcies. Wadhwani [21], however, has 
found that at an aggregate level inflation does (positively) influence bankruptcy rates.
10. We do not repeat precisely these regressions even with parameter adjustments since it 
is evident ab initio that the sampling procedure is nonoptimal.
11. We did not break the total sample up into initial and holdout samples. Since the results 
on an initial sample are at least as good as on a holdout the results in Table 2 represent 
an upper bound to the accuracy achievable on a holdout.
12. See note 8.
13. We note however that our results on are very much of the same order of magnitude 
as those reported by Palepu [15] for his takeover studies which incorporated appropriate 
parameter adjustments to allow for sample selection bias.
14. The sample proportion of B’s is larger in our study than in the SKWW study even before 
any parameter adjustment has been made. The effects of this on overall classification 
accuracy are as Palepu shows ambiguous. Thus our results are consistent with Palepu’s 
[15, p. 9].
15. The ratio of predicted B's to actual B’s is in this case 19. Thus for every correctly identified 
B there are 19 A's incorrectly classified as fi’s. Whether this kind of error rate constitutes 
a problem will of course depend on the decision context and the marginal cost of Type 
I errors.
16. In fact we use the population of small firms in the database with these characteristics. 
While we do not pretend that the sample is representative of small firms as a whole 
it is perhaps more so of the more successful small firms. This feature of the sample is 
however is interesting in its own right.
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17. The extent of bias cannot be estimated a la Heckman [8] since there apparently exists 
no variable in the SKWW database that is present for all observations. The existence 
of such a variable is necessary to facilitate estimation of the probability of missing 
financial data for each firm in the estimating sample.
18. The sample proportion of B's is thus around 2%. The sample proportion of B’s in the 
SKWW database over the whole period 1970-1980 (applying to firms of all '‘ages” of 
data) is considerably larger at around 10%. The figure of 2% applying here is closer to 
that for large firms and probably reflects the failure rate of the more ''successful” small 
firms in some general sense of this term.
19. The sense in which the financial models tested are trend models is that the initial 
specification includes each variable plus all of its lags. The final model of course includes 
only those variables satisfying the entry/exit criterion of 10% significance.
20. We define the partial correlation coefficient in this context by r =  [(MLE chi-square 
”■ 2)/(—2Lo>))]^ ^^ . It lies between —1 and 1 (r is set =  0 if MLE <  2) and provides a measure 
of the contribution of the variables independent of sample size.
21. Since we specify a 5-year lag model in the combined regressions with financial variables, 
only years 1976-1980 will of necessity be available for estimation.
22. The subject-matter of a future paper will be to identify the precise macroeconomic factors 
generating these year-effects. Preliminary investigations show that the year-dummies are 
proxying macro-variables such as inflation rates (seeming to confirm Wadhwani [21]). 
In the present study such year-dummies have functioned simply as a heuristic device.
23. These results are for the '‘incomplete” or three consecutive years’ financial data firms 
in the SKWW study. This methodology is the one closest to ours since we do not require 
consecutiveness at all.
24. To enhance interpretation of the variables of the model we standardized all variables 
to zero mean and unit variance. This allows regression coefficient ratios to represent 
marginal rates of substitution between corresponding variables along probability 
isoquants when evaluated at variable means.
25. Prediction accuracy is defined as the proportion of the original sample predicted to be 
B's (A's) that are in fact B's (A's). It is not "prediction” in the holdout sample sense. 
It does, however, provide some intuitive guide to the model’s ability to predict. 
Furthermore, as we have noted, many of the studies in this area have used highly biased 
holdout samples with attendant spurious classification and prediction accuracy.
26. Recall that this definition is effectively of retained profit and is different from the 
economist’s and finance theorist’s idea of profits. This is because (1) it is not a cash­
flow measure (it includes arbidrary allowances for depreciation), and (2) because it does 
not refer to shareholder distributions. In view of these facts we attempted to test the 
effectiveness of definitions of profitability closer to the economic concept of cash-flow 
profits. For example. Net Profit +  Depreciation provides a better approximation to 
operating profit and cash-flow than does the definition used in the text. However, this 
measure did not perform as well as that presented. We conclude that despite its smaller 
intuitive appeal Net Profit/Total Assets is the "appropriate” variable to use.
27. It is worth noting that the average rate of profit on total assets for the whole sample 
is a mere 4%. Thus the typical small firm does not require a catastrophic change of 
fortunes to slip from solvency into insolvency.
28. Recall that we have not dropped one of the pair W3, W7. Thus the sign of L2W7 is 
the negative of that of L5W3, which conforms to what is said in the text.
29. This can be seen in a univariate analysis of lagged mean values of (Short Term Loans 
+  Overdrafts)/Total assets. For the set of active firms this is constant at around 10%.
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For the set of bankrupts the ratio is steeply increasing (from about 15% to 25%) as the 
date of bankruptcy approaches. Meanwhile Net Working Capital/TA is steeply 
declining.
30. I am indebted to an anonymous referee for this point.
31. Presumably the higher bankruptcy-proneness of such firms is not identified by their 
banks.
32. These points are predicated on the assumption that the goodness-of-fit measures reflect 
prediction accuracy, and hence on the accuracy of a holdout test.
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